The latest threat from the rise of Chinese manufacturing
If in retrospect all that seems obvious, it’s only because the research by David Autor, an MIT labor economist, and his colleagues has become an accepted, albeit often distorted, political narrative these days: China destroyed all our manufacturing jobs! Though the nuances of the research are often ignored, the results help explain at least some of today’s political unrest. It’s reflected in rising calls for US protectionism, President Trump’s broad tariffs on imported goods, and nostalgia for the lost days of domestic manufacturing glory.
The impacts of the original China shock still scar much of the country. But Autor is now concerned about what he considers a far more urgent problem—what some are calling China shock 2.0. The US, he warns, is in danger of losing the next great manufacturing battle, this time over advanced technologies to make cars and planes as well as those enabling AI, quantum computing, and fusion energy.
Recently, I asked Autor about the lingering impacts of the China shock and the lessons it holds for today’s manufacturing challenges.
How are the impacts of the China shock still playing out?
I have a recent paper looking at 20 years of data, from 2000 to 2019. We tried to ask two related questions. One, if you looked at the places that were most exposed, how have they adjusted? And then if you look to the people who are most exposed, how have they adjusted? And how do those two things relate to one anothe
It turns out you get two very different answers. If you look at places that were most exposed, they have been substantially transformed. Manufacturing, once it starts going down, never comes back. But after 2010, these trade-impacted local labor markets staged something of an employment recovery, such that employment has grown faster after 2010 in trade-exposed places than non-trade-exposed places because a lot of people have come in. But these are jobs mostly in low-wage sectors. They’re in K–12 education and non-traded health services. They’re in warehousing and logistics. They’re in hospitality and lodging and recreation, and so they’re lower-wage, non-manufacturing jobs. And they’re done by a really different set of people.
The growth in employment is among women, among native-born Hispanics, among foreign-born adults and a lot of young people. The recovery is staged by a very different group from the white and black men, but especially white men, who were most represented in manufacturing. They have not really participated in this renaissance.
Employment is growing, but are these areas prospering?
